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ABSTRACT
Work requirements in means-tested transfer programs have grown in importance in the U.S. and in
some other countries. The theoretical literature which considers their possible optimality generally
operates within a traditional welfarist framework where some function of the utility of the poor is
maximized. Here we consider a case where society is paternalistic and instead has preferences over
the actual work allocations of welfare recipients. With this social welfare function, optimality of
work requirements is possible but depends on the accuracy of the screening mechanism which
assigns work requirements to some benefit recipients and not others. Numerical simulations show
that the accuracy must be high for such optimality to occur. The simulations also show that earnings






moffitt@jhu.eduWork requirements in means-tested (or “welfare”) programs have seen a resurgence in the
last twenty years in the U.S. and in a few European countries.   These requirements generally
stipulate that benefit recipients must work or engage in some work-like activity for some
minimum number of hours each week.  Most economists who have studied the welfare system
have opposed work requirements.  Milton Friedman, for example, believed that welfare should
be administered through a negative income tax with benefits based solely on income.   Other
economists have criticized work requirements for being administratively unworkable, for
introducing discretion into the system on the part of caseworkers, and for generating incentives
on the part of individuals to avoid the requirements (Barth and Greenberg, 1971; Browning,
1975; Lurie, 1975).   In addition, the classic optimal tax framework of Mirrlees (1971), which
generates a negative income tax as an optimal solution in a utilitarian maximization model,
allows only the manipulation of guarantees and tax rates and permits no other policy instrument
to be used.
However, there is a body of research papers operating within the optimal tax framework
which does consider the possibility that work requirements might be part of a solution.   Akerlof
(1978) noted that if those with low job skills who have extreme difficulty in becoming employed-
-that is, those who are deemed, by some definition, to be unable to work--can be partly identified
by some measurable, observable characteristic (or “tagged”),  then it is possible that social
welfare could be improved if those who are untagged, and hence able to work, are denied support
because the tagged individuals can then be paid higher benefits.   Diamond and Sheshinski2
(1995), Parsons (1996), and Salanié (2002) have similar models which broaden the set of
assumptions and applications of the general idea of using an imperfect observable indicator of
need to separate the population.   There is also a literature which assumes no tagging (i.e., no
observable characteristic to differentiate individuals) but which finds work requirements to be
optimal only under restricted conditions in that case (Brett (1998), Beaudry and Blackorby
(2004), Cuff (2000), Fortin et al. (1993),  Besley and Coate (1992,1995); see Kaplow (2004) for
further discussion).   Of these, only Besley and Coate are able to provide a strong case for work
requirements, and only then by assuming a nonwelfarist social welfare function with an income
maintenance criterion which puts little value on leisure.
This study provides a new model of optimal work requirements.  The primary departure
from the previous literature is to use a nonwelfarist social welfare function which represents
society as caring directly about the level of work of the poor, not just their utility.   Unlike Besley
and Coate, the major previous model with a nonwelfarist social welfare function, it is assumed
that work, rather than income, enters the social welfare function directly.   Society is assumed to 
value of the leisure time of some families, but only if their true skill (=ability) is low; if their true
skill is sufficiently high, society expects them to work.   The assumption that work per se is
valued is based upon observation of the history of redistributional policy in the U.S. over the last
thirty years, which, it is argued here and has been argued elsewhere (Moffitt, 2002a, 2003a), 
makes clear that voters do not accept the preferences of the poor but instead wish to force onto
them specific allocations toward food, medical expenditure, housing, and other goods.   It is
commonly observed that this attitude is responsible for the rise in in-kind transfer programs for
food, medical expenditure, and housing, for example, and for the decline in pure cash programs3
which allow recipients to spend their transfers according to their own preferences.   A similar
paternalistic attitude can be argued to be responsible for the rise in the desire for society to have
recipients work even if though those recipients could achieve an equal, or higher, level of utility
with less work and the same governmental expenditure.
With this change of objective function, work requirements follow directly as a possible
instrument for improving social welfare (a work requirement program is defined as one in which
a screening process results in some recipients being required to work a minimum hours to receive
benefits and other recipients being allowed to receive a benefit for not working).  In fact, work
requirements may be optimal even if ability is completely observed.   But in the more realistic
case of partially unobserved ability, work requirements become a policy instrument that is more
likely to be used within a standard screening model if the screening mechanism is accurate
enough.  The paper lays out several models of this type.   Numerical simulations are presented
which show the utility gains and losses from each type of policy under different assumptions
about the accuracy of the screening mechanism.  An important feature of the simulations, not
always a focus of attention in prior work, is the distribution of utility gains and losses across
those of high and low ability resulting from each scenario.
A by-product of the model and the simulations is a new justification for earnings
subsidies and for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the U.S.   While earnings subsidies are
never optimal in the standard Mirrlees framework, they can be optimal with the relaxation of
some of the assumptions in that framework, either the assumption that labor supply decisions are
at the intensive margin or that home productivity is high (Saez, 2002;  Beaudry and Blackorby,
2004;  Choné and Laroque, 2005;  Laroque, 2005).    Earnings subsidies are often optimal here,  Work requirements have a long history in welfare reform.  How and why they were
1
used in the 1834 English Poor Law has generated a particularly large literature (e.g., Boyer,
1990).
4
instead, because work is included directly in the social welfare function.
The next section provides institutional background on work requirements in the U.S.
welfare system and more discussion of the evidence in favor of paternalism.  The following
section presents several models of paternalistic social welfare preferences, and the subsequent
section presents the results of the simulations.  A summary and conclusion ends the paper.
Institutional Background
Proposals for various types of work requirements in welfare have been growing in
frequency over the last thirty years in the U.S. but, until the 1990s, were not enforced (Moffitt,
2003b).    However, Congressional legislation in 1996  required work requirements of all states
1
operating cash programs for single mothers, stipulating that at least 50 percent of single-parent
recipients work or be in work-related activities.  A minimum of 20 hours of work per week were
required and exemptions were significantly narrowed.  By 2000, about one-third of TANF
recipients were in work or in a work-related activity (U.S. DHHS, 2002), an historic high.  The
impact of work requirements was made possible by the extensive use of sanctions, or benefit
reductions for failure to comply with the requirements.  Nationwide, about 5 percent of welfare
recipients are sanctioned each month (Bloom and Winstead, 2002).  Thus, for the first time in the
history of the program, the work requirements were fairly vigorously enforced.
All states allow some exemptions from work requirements.  Most often exemptions are5
granted if the welfare recipient has a very young child or is disabled or in poor health, and
sometimes if the recipient is caring for an older family member or lacks transportation to get to
work.    However, while official exemptions exist in the law in each state, local offices and
individual caseworkers exercise considerable discretion in appying the exemptions and therefore
in deciding who should be required to work (Diller, 2000, Lurie, 2001), as well as discretion in
choosing when to apply sanctions (Bloom and Winstead, 2002 and Pavetti and Bloom, 2001).  
There is very little systematic and statistically-based empirical evidence on the extent of this
discretion, but there is a large literature documenting its existence with case studies.
The increasing use of work requirements is prima facie evidence that voters care directly
about work, for if it were merely a matter of voters becoming more conservative about
redistribution, they could have instead simply reduced benefits.   The most articulate spokesman
for work and other requirements is Mead (1986,1997), who argues that the welfare system should
be used to change the behavior of recipients in a way that will improve their well-being even
though they do not realize it.   Indeed, the debate over the 1990s welfare reform was widely
characterized at the time as concerning not the efficiency of the system or the amount of
redistribution, but rather about “values,” namely, the importance of imposing society-wide values
governing regarding work behavior, self-betterment, and marriage and childbearing decisions
onto the poor.   This paternalistic attitude is consistent with the long-run trend away from cash
transfers and toward in-kind transfers such as those for food, housing, and medical care (Moffitt,
2002a, 2003a), reflecting a desire on the part of voters to specify the types of goods consumed by
the poor and, implicitly, a desire to override the preferences of the poor themselves.
An interesting question, but one beyond the scope of this paper, is why society values  A rather different explanation is that many recipients are working but do not report that
2
to the government, in which case a work requirement will induce them to either leave welfare or
report their earnings.
6
work so highly.  While it is not difficult to understand voters’ desire to see poor families have
minimum amounts of food, clothing, and housing, it is not obvious why voters would think that
work per se has intrinsic value to a poor person.  One explanation is that the poor are lazy, as in
Cuff (2000), and the model below could be interpreted as an alternative formulation of that
notion.  It has also often been suggested that work may lead to human capital investment and lead
to a lower likelihood of being poor and on welfare in the future, although it not clear why
subsidies to formal education and training are explicitly prohibited under the 1996 law.   It has
also been suggested that work will improve the self-esteem of the poor; that their utility should
increase if their income comes from earnings rather than welfare benefits per se; and that
working and being off welfare (holding income fixed) will have beneficial effects on children.   
2
None of these explanations suggest why work requirements have become more popular over
time, however, and here the major suggestion that has been made is that the rising rate of female
labor force participation in the general society has led to a greater social norm that women with
children should work.  These issues would be useful for a separate exploration.
Some Paternalistic Models of Welfare Work Requirements
Illustrative Models with Full Welfare Participation. We begin with a simple illustrative
model and state a more general model subsequently.  Assume we have a poor population with
preferences over leisure and income given by U(L,I) where L is a dichotomous indicator for7
working (L=1) or not working (L=0) and I is income.   While preferences are homogeneous, the
" wage is heterogeneous and is given by W , where " has a two-point distribution with "=1 for
high ability individuals and "=0 for low ability individuals.  In the development below, we will
take " to be either completely observed, partially observed, or completely unobserved by the
government.
Assuming there is no private income other than earnings, those off welfare have income
" I=W L.   The government pays a welfare benefit G to nonworkers and a benefit B to workers,
where B will generally be set according to a negative income tax formula B=G-tW, where t is the
" tax rate.  Income on welfare is I= (W +B)L+G(1-L) .  G and B may be set at different levels for
"" those of different ability, if that ability can be fully or partially observed, e.g., G  and B  in the
1 fully observed case.   In this initial model, we will assume that W <(G/t), which implies that
high-ability individuals (and therefore low-ability individuals as well) who work will be eligible
for a positive benefit.   We will make the model more realistic below by relaxing this
assumption, for it has little effect on the main results.   We also assume that the high-ability
individuals always work in the absence of any transfer program.
The government (or the voters, society, or the welfare agency, all taken as equivalent
here) has a preference function over the utilities of the two ability types but also cares whether
" they work.   If p is the fraction of the population of type "=1 and if  L  is the work level of type
", we assume the government preference function to be
1 1 0            V   =   pL U(1,W +B)  +  (1-p)(1-L ) U(0,G)                                                           (1)  Low-ability single mothers with young children are intended for this group as well,
3
although for them the presumption is that their home productivity (i.e., the value to their staying
at home with their children) is high relative to their market wage.   We do not introduce home
productivity for simplicity.
1 1 1 0 0   A more general model would allow V=V [L ,U(1,W +B)] + V [L ,U(0,G)] and hence
4
permit substitutability between L and U.  But then the numerical simulations in the next section
would have to assume values for those substitution parameters.  We therefore work only with the
extreme case in this paper. 
8
This function is a polar case where the society desires that high-ability individuals work and that
low-ability individuals not work.   The government therefore may wish to override individual
preferences.   The low-ability individuals may consist only of the disabled or those otherwise in
poor health, or may extend up the ability distribution to an arbitrary point.   The society obtains
3
no utility from high-ability individuals who do not work or from low-ability individuals who
work; this extreme assumption could be relaxed by letting society put lesser weight on the
alternative states, without changing the tenor of the results.
4
In this  illustrative model, it will be assumed for simplicity that p=1/2.  Hence the
government objective function is 
1 1 0            V   =   L U(1,W +B)  +  (1-L ) U(0,G)                                                                      (2)
This object of this paper is to work out the theoretical and numerical implications of assuming
that (2) or some variant of it represents societal preferences.  
1 The government is assumed to know the parameters of U as well as the values W  and
0 W  in the population.   Its information beyond this depends on the observability of ":  if it is
" fully observed, the government knows the W  for each individual;  if it is partially observed, the  We ignore the fact that, even in the completely unobserved case, the government can
5
deduce the wage of those individuals who choose to work (as in Laroque(2005)).   We assume
instead that the government must set benefits and work requirements in this case prior to
observing the L and WL that will determine benefits. We also assume that individuals cannot
hide, or affect the reporting of, their true W or L.   See Maderner and Rochet (1995) for a
discussion of the consequences of allowing such behavior.
9
" government only knows the value of a characteristic that is correlated with W ; and if it is
completely unobserved, the government has no additional information.    Given its information
5
set, the government then sets a benefit schedule {G,B} and decides whether to impose a work
requirement to maximize V.
We will also assume that the government has a fixed amount of expenditure per poor
person (the size of the poor population is fixed), Y, to spend on transfer benefits, and hence we
will sidestep the full optimal tax problem.  This is a major simplication which allows us to focus
on the low income population.   One could vary this expenditure amount and calculate the utility
loss from taxpayers arising from of each its levels, and thereby conduct a fuller analysis than is
conducted in this paper.
Fully Observed ".   In this case the government can make lump sum transfers to each
1 ability group of individuals.   Denote these transfers as B , the lump sum transfer to high-ability
0 individuals, and G , the lump sum transfer to low-ability individuals (since the transfers are lump
1 1 0 0 sum, the welfare tax rate for both groups is zero and hence B =G  and B =G ).   Without a
1 0 work requirement, the government picks B  and G   to maximize (2) subject to the budget
1 0 1 0 constraint, Y=B +G , and subject to constraints to insure that L =1 and L =0 are chosen:
1 1 1               U(1,W +B ) $ U(0,B )                                                                                            (3) With the assumption that leisure is a normal good, (5) will exhibit the single crossing-
6
point property and a unique solution will exist.  We will assume that it is an internal solution and
that so that (5) holds with equality, even though it is possible that one or the other benefit might
be driven to zero without equating marginal utilities.
10
0 0 0               U(1,W +G ) # U(0,G )                                                                                            (4)       
The potential problem with the solution is that the solution ignoring (3) and (4) may
1 0 violate those conditions.  Simply maximizing (2) (assuming L =1 and L =0) subject to the
budget constraint leads to the marginal condition
2 0 2 1 1                  U (0,G )=U (1,W +B )                                                                                       (5)
1 0 which can be solved for B  and G  by combining it with the budget constraint.   This condition
6
equalizes marginal utilities of income across groups; if L and I are separable in the utility
1 0 function, incomes are also equalized.  If this condition holds at a point where L =1 and  L =0
voluntarily,  the optimum can be achieved without a work requirement.  However, there are cases
1 0 where this will not hold and where the provision of the lump sum benefits B  and G  dictated by
(5) will induce the high-ability group to not work and hence will violate (3).    If a lump sum
1 0 program is to prevent this, B  must be lowered (and hence G  must  rise to satisfy the budget
constraint) until (3) is satisfied in equality, but this will lead to a violation of (5).   A work
1 requirement, on the other hand, will be superior in this case because it will impose L =1 for the
high-ability group and benefits can then be set according to (5), thereby achieving the first-best
solution.  High-ability individuals will not reject this benefit because it is better than nothing.   The societal preference functions in (1) and (2) imply distributional weights because
7
marginal utility declines with income.  However, there may be distributional considerations
above and beyond what is implied by these functions.   Note that the result that work
requirements result in more distribution toward the better-off is seemingly inconsistent with the
general result in the literature that tagging allows more expenditure to be concentrated on the
worse-off.  But the literature result is comparing an NIT program under completely unknown "
to a tagging program under a completely or partially known ", and in that comparison the work
requirement program does result in more distribution toward the worse off (see below).
11
1 This work requirement solution will dominate the lump sum solution because a lower B  and a
0 higher G  than that dictated by (5) will lead to a lower V.   The distributional implications of the
work-requirement solution are unfavorable because it allows higher benefits to be paid to the
better-off, high-ability individuals and hence lower benefits to the worse-off, low-ability
individuals.    One implication of these results is that the optimality of work requirements does
7
not depend upon the existence of uncertainty about ", given the government preference function
we have assumed. 
Completely Unobserved ".  With " completely unobserved, the solution without a work
requirement requires manipulation of a negative income tax (NIT) formula in which only B and
G (or, equivalently, G and t) are available as policy instruments.  The government will
1 manipulate the formula to maximize (2), with the awareness that the formula will affect the L
0 and L  chosen by the two groups (even though they cannot be distinguished a priori).  It is clear
1 that an income-equalizing choice of B and G (i.e., t=1), which is the first-best solution if L =1
0 and L =0 could be maintained (and assuming separability of the utility function), will result in an
1 inferior solution because L =0 (i.e., high ability individuals will not work and the government
can then not distinguish them from low-ability, non-working individuals) and the objective
function in (2) will fall.  The government will consequently raise B and lower G (or equivalently,12
lower G and t), relative to these first-best values, just enough to induce work among the more
able, which is a standard screening result.   Thus the tax rate will fall from t=1 to some lesser
value.   The exact value to which it will fall is determined by the incentive compatibility
constraints, which are now:
1 1               U(1,W +B ) $ U(0,G)                                                                                              (6)
0 0               U(1,W +B ) # U(0,G)                                                                                              (7)
"" where B  =G-tW .  At t=1, (7) is satisfied but (6) is not.  The government will lower t and G
until (6) is satisfied in equality (this will always occur before (7) is violated) and hence this will
determine optimal benefits.  Optimal V will be lower than what it was in the case of known ".  
Also compared to the known " case, the NIT has unfavorable distributional implications because
it shifts funds to the better off; gaining more information about " therefore could be seen as an
investment in assisting the worse-off individuals in the population.  Note as well that it is
possible that the optimum will occur at t<0, which is a type of earnings subsidy solution.   
Adding work requirements when " is not known means that requirements must be
imposed on everyone.  If they are imposed, low ability individuals will either work to obtain the
benefit, or not work and receive no benefits.  Given the social utility function in (2), the
government would prefer that they do the latter, because low ability individuals who work
contribute nothing to (2) and any expenditure on them would be wasted.   The government will
therefore set G and t so that only high-ability individuals work and receive all expenditure.  The This result assumes that only benefit formulas linear in W are used.  If nonlinear
8
0 formulas are possible, the government could simply pay a positive benefit if W>W  and not
otherwise.
13
1 0 solution for G and t will satisfy 2Y=G-tW  and U(0,0)>U(1,G-tW ).    A negative t may be
8
required to keep low-ability individuals from working.  This result would obviously be
moderated if some social weight were given to low-ability workers.  The optimum in this case is
even farther from the first-best than is the NIT solution outlined in the previous paragraph and
hence will always be inferior to that solution, and the distributional consequences are also clearly
more unfavorable.
These two polar cases bracket the case where " is partially observed.   They imply that
work requirements are more likely to be optimal, and more likely to have favorable distributional
implications, the more observed is the ability parameter ".   The accuracy of the observability
mechanism is therefore the critical empirical question.
Partially Observed ".  We assume that the government observes a continuous signal s for
each individual which is positively correlated with " but nevertheless contains noise.   The
government is assumed to know the distribution function of the errors.   We focus on how the
availability of this signal can improve targeting of work requirements.   A work requirement can
be assigned if s>s* and not otherwise, where s* is a government-chosen cutoff for the signal.  
Letting F(s*) be the probability that an "=1 individual has s>s* and H(s*) be the probability that
an "=0 individual has s<s*  (F’<0, H’>0), and assuming the government to be an expected utility
maximizer, its objective function is now14
1 1 1 1 1 1         E(V)  =     F(s*) U(1,W +B )  +  [1-F(s*)] 1[U(1,W +B )>U(0, G)] U(1,W +B )  
0 0                      +  H(s*)1[U(0,G)>U(1,W +B )]  U(0,G)                                                    (8)
"" where 1 is the indicator function and where B =G-tW .   Here we assume that individuals who
are told they must work always comply (this assumption is relaxed when we allow welfare
nonparticipation below).  The government chooses G, t, and s* subject to the budget constraint
1              Y  =  F(s*)B  
1 1 1 1 1                       +  [1-F(s*)] { 1[U(1,W +B )>U(0,G)] B   +  1[U(1,W +B )#U(0,G)] G }              
0 0 0 0 0                +  H(s*) { 1[U(0,G)>U(1,W +B )]G  +  1[U(0,G)#U(1,W +B )]B  }
0                       +  [1-H(s*)]B                                                                                                      (9)
The first order conditions are cumbersome to specify because of the nonlinearity of the
choice functions but the influences on the choices are clear enough.  Increases in G raise benefits
for nonworkers and hence improve the utility of low-ability workers not subject to a work
requirement but also lead to utility losses from those high-ability workers not subject to work
requirements who quit work.  Increases in t also drive more high-ability workers not subject to a
work requirement to nonwork.   Loosening the stringency of the requirement by raising s* lets
more high-ability individuals off the hook but puts more low-ability individuals into the correct,
no-requirement category.    The government utility from this program will be in between those in
the two polar cases.15
A More General Model.  The next section of the paper will report numerical calculations
from a calibrated model which is generalized from these simple models.  The main
generalization is to allow a continuum of types rather than just two.   Let F(") be the c.d.f. of ".  
Assume that society desires that those with ">"* work and that those with "<"* not work.   As
discussed in the early sections of this paper, how voters arrive at a particular "* is not considered
here but is instead taken as given.  In the simulations in the next section, "* will be taken to be a
particular percentile point in the distribution, and that point will be varied.
The government objective is the following:
                              4                                                      "* 
"" " " "      Max    V   =    I   L U(1,W +P B ) dF(")   +    I  (1-L )U(0,G)dF(")                     (10)
        S                 "*                                                    -4
                   
"" " where B  =  G - tW   , P  is a dummy variable indicating participation in the welfare system,
and S is the government instrument set, either {G,t} alone or this set plus work requirements. 
Here we now allow individuals to choose whether to participate in welfare, and thereby allow
low-ability individuals who do not accept the work requirement to opt out of the system as well
as allow the government to make some high-ability individuals ineligible.   This objective is
maximized subject to the individual choice functions for L and P, which are a function of S, and
the government budget constraint.
No attempt is made here to characterize the possible solutions to this generalized model
for either arbitrary or specific parametric forms of the ability distribution and signal error
distribution.   However, the calibrations in the next section, which will assume normality for the
distributions of both, will result in substantive modification of the solutions outlined in the two-16
point ability distribution assumed earlier in this section.   While there will always be a low-ability
group which does not work and receives benefits, and a high-ability that works and receives
benefits, two other groups will often appear in the solution.   One is a group of high-ability
individuals who work and receive no benefits and hence are off welfare, as described previously;
but another is a group of low-ability individuals who neither work nor receive benefits but who
are not the lowest-ability individuals.   This case will be discussed in more detail in the next
section.
Simulations
The model described in (10) is calibrated to a labor supply model estimated by Keane and
Moffitt (1998).   Keane and Moffitt (KM) used a 1984 cross-sectional data set containing
information on weekly hours of work, hourly wages, and welfare program participation on a
sample of 968 single mothers with low levels of assets and who are therefore likely to be eligible
for welfare if not working.   The model assumed a quadratic utility function U(H,I)=$H-(H +I- 2
*I +c,  where c is a constant.   Interactions between H and I were tested and rejected.  The 2
parameter $ was allowed to vary across individuals by KM but here it is taken as fixed; we
calibrate its conditional mean to fit the observed fraction of women in the KM data who were
working (.50).   We define L=1 to equal 20 hours per week.  With this modification, and with the
necessary translations of parameters to a dichotomous outcome, the utility function becomes
                        U(L,I)  =   $L    +  I   -  *I    +  c                                                                   (11) 2   All dollar amounts in this paper are taken from KM and hence are 1984 dollars.
9
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where the redefined $=-80 and *=.000315.   With the normalization of the coefficient on I to 1, 
$=-80 implies that 20 hours of work reduces utility by about $80.    The constant term in (11) is
set to zero.
KM jointly estimated an hourly wage equation of the form logW=X8+<,  where X is a set
of regressors (age, education, etc.) and < is a normally distributed error.  Adjustments for
selection bias from the absence of observed wages for nonworkers were made, so that the
estimates are to be interpreted as offer wages for all individuals whether working or not.   The
predicted wage at the KM mean of the X vector was $4.00 per hour and the estimated standard
deviation of < was estimated to be .51.    We take < to be the equivalent of " in the theoretical
9
model.  We take 1,000 random draws from a N(0,.51 ) distribution and use them to create a wage
2
distribution.  With the assumed utility function parameters we can predict the utility-maximizing
choice of L for each individual for each budget constraint.
The government budget constraint is taken from KM as well, for their data had
information on average welfare benefits and the percent of the population receiving benefits. 
The mean weekly benefit among recipients was $64 which, combined with the welfare
participation rate of .30 in their sample, implies a mean benefit over entire target population of
$19.2 per week per capita.  With a simulation sample of 1,000 individuals, we therefore set the
weekly budget constraint for the government to $19,200.   With all parameters specified and with
a government budget constraint, we can find the values of G and t that produce the maximal
value of V, and whether work requirements improve or lower that value.  We can also produce
the distribution of utilities among gainers and losers from each government scheme for the 1,00018
simulated individuals.
The first column of Table 1 shows the values of utility at decile points of the wage
distribution if there is no transfer program present, in which case each individual utility is the
maximum of  zero (the value of (11) with L=I=0; this is a normalized value) and $+W-*W, 2
where W is equal to 20 times the individual’s hourly wage.  About half of the population does
not work at all, a typical figure for low-wage single mother samples in the U.S. and equal to that
in KM by construction.
Known ".  In this case the two programs to be considered are, as described previously, a
program of lump sum transfers and one with work requirements.  We will consider cases, in turn,
where the government wishes that the highest 90 percent, 75 percent, and 50 percent of the
ability distribution in the poor population work; or, equivalently, where it exempts the lowest 10
percent, 25 percent, and 50 percent, respectively.  The last of these will be the easiest to achieve
because it is closest to the utilitarian solution (i.e., the solution for a social welfare function
0 1 which is a straight sum of poor utilities, without L  or L ; this solution equalizes marginal
utilities of income); the others will be more difficult.  No percents lower than 50 will be
considered because about 50 percent of the poor population is working in the absence of any
program.
As described in the theoretical discussion, the initial inclination of the government will be
to lower benefits for high-ability individuals relative to the utilitarian solution to induce them to
work; or, in the work requirement case, to not reduce benefits but simply require that they work
to receive a benefit.  But, unlike the case of a two-point distribution of ability, here there may be
a portion of the population which does not work and is not given any benefit because the19
government wishes them to work but has insufficient funds to induce them to do so.  In the case
in which 90 percent of the poor population is desired to work, for example, offering financial
support to those in the 11  percentile of the ability distribution is a waste of money if they are not
th
induced to work because the government receives no social utility from those individuals if they
do not work.
There are, in total, four possible categories of how individuals are treated.  The solution
for V will be of the general form:
1 3                                n                         n                                 1000                           
i i i                    V   =    G  U(0,G)   +      G     U(1,W +B )   +       G     U(1,W )                        (12)       
                               2 3                            i=1                  i=n +1                             i=n +1
1 1 where n  is the number of low-ability nonworkers receiving benefits (n  will generally constitute
the lower 10 percent, 25 percent, or 50 percent of the population whom the government wishes
2 1 not to work), n -n  is the number of nonworking individuals in the next highest portion of the
ability distribution who receive nothing and hence do not contribute to V if they are high ability,
3 2 3 n -n  is the number of recipient high ability workers, and 1000-n  is the number of high-ability
i i working nonrecipients.  The benefit is B =G-W  because incomes are equalized among those
who receive benefits.
Table 1 shows the simulated optima under the lump sum and work requirement programs. 
If the government desires 90 percent of the poor population to work and tries to do so with a
lump sum program, it will concentrate all of its benefits on the bottom 10 percent of the ability
distribution and will give nothing to nonworkers or workers above that point.   Benefits are not
given to workers because the benefits that those on the margin of working (around the 50
th
percentile) would receive would induce some of  them to quit work.  Benefits are not given to20
those between the 10  and 50  percentile because they are high ability yet not working, and any
th th
positive benefit would only reduce their incentive to work.  In the work requirement program,
however, high-ability individuals can be offered benefits only if they work; in the resulting
optimum, the incomes of individuals in the (50.7,81.1) portion of the ability distribution are
given benefits.  This results in a lowering of benefits for the bottom 10 percent of the ability
distribution.   Those between the 10  and 50.7th percentile points are still given nothing because
th
the government has insufficient funds to offer them a high enough work benefit supplement to
induce them to work.  Social utility (V) is necessarily higher under the work requirement
program because it has an additional policy instrument which loosens the incentive compability
constraint faced under the lump sum program.
While this result may seem unrealistic, the U.S. experience can be interpreted as exactly
reflecting this solution.  Welfare reform in the 1990s in the U.S. concentrated benefits on a more
disadvantaged population, and it has been documented repeatedly that many of those former
recipients who have left welfare are not working (Fang and Keane, 2004;  Moffitt, 2002b).  At
the same time, the rise of the EITC can be interpreted as supplementing the benefits of those who
are of sufficiently high ability to work but only up to a maximum level, beyond which no
additional subsidy is provided.   Thus the four categories of individuals described in this solution
appear to exist in the current U.S. situation.
For the cases where 75 percent or 50 percent of the population is desired to work, again
benefits are paid to the lowest 25 and 50 percent of the ability distribution, respectively; no
benefits are paid to nonworkers in a portion of the ability distribution above this; and no benefits
are paid to workers.   No benefits are paid to workers because the government expenditure is In many of the cases in the table, utility is lower for many of those off welfare than for
10
those on welfare. This is because those off welfare work and lose the utility value of leisure, and
because a marginal redistribution of income toward those workers lowers V.
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entirely absorbed by paying benefits to those whom it desires not to work; the resulting average
benefit is sufficiently low that the wages of workers exceed this benefit (recall that taxation is not
allowed, and hence incomes of higher-wage workers cannot be equalized with those below if
their wages exceed the benefit level).     The solution is the same under the lump sum and work
10
requirement programs because the only difference in those programs is whether benefits are paid
to workers, and in neither of these cases is that done.  Thus we find that work requirements are
optimal only if the percent of the population desired to work is high.
Completely Unobserved ".   Table 2 shows the solutions for the case of completely
unobserved " for NIT and work requirement programs.  The NIT results represent solutions to
linear NIT programs which maximize V by manipulating G and t only, while the work
requirement programs add the requirement that benefits can be received only if the recipient
works.  When 90 percent of the population is desired to work, the NIT solution is to eliminate
support for nonworkers entirely (G=0) and to offer an earnings subsidy with t=-.26.  The gain
from inducing as many individuals to work as possible leads the guarantee to be reduced to zero. 
The losses in utility from not paying benefits to the lowest 10 percent of the distribution are
outweighed by the gains from inducing all individuals in the percentile range (33.4, 50.6) to work
whereas they would not have worked if no program had been offered, and by the gains from
paying benefits to workers higher up the distribution.   The work requirement solution in this In the theoretical section above, it was never necessary to reduce G to zero to induce
11
high-ability individuals to work, but that followed from the assumption that high-ability
individuals would always work in the absence of any program.  Here, with 90 percent of the
population desired to work but only 50 percent working in the absence of the program, about 40
percent of the “high ability” distribution is not working in the absence of the program.
22
case is identical; G=0 by definition, and therefore the solution must be the same as the NIT.
11
The programs diverge for the 75 and 50 percent cases.   When only 75 percent of the
population is desired to work, the NIT solution results in a small but positive G but still an
earnings subsidy, t=-.22.   Nonworkers in the bottom 25 percent receive some support and less is
given to those higher up the distribution as a consequence.  But the work requirement program,
which cannot pay benefits to nonworkers, now suffers because a larger fraction of the population
whom the government does not wish to work (25 percent) receives no support.   The work
requirement solution is the same as before, but with lower V.   When 50 percent of the
population is desired to work, the NIT solution offers a higher G and a tax rate of approximately
zero, and V reaches the maximum of any program in the table.   The value of V for the work
requirement program falls further because even more individuals whom the government desires
not to work receive no support.    Thus, it is clear that when " is completely unknown, work
requirement programs are inferior to linear NIT schemes.
As expected, the values of V are lower for all these cases than obtain under known ".  
Also as expected, the distributional implications of these cases are unfavorable relative to those
under known ".
Partially Observed ".    Partial observability is simulated by adding noise to the wage
equation and by assuming that the resulting wage is what is observed by the government.  This
“signal” wage is then used to categorize the population into those who are required to work or23
not required.   The signal error is constructed as
                 s  =  L   +   [(1-k)/k]  ,                                                                                      (13) 1/2
where L is the true wage error and , is the noise.  The parameter k controls the amount of noise,
with k=1 implying no noise and k=0 implying infinite noise.   The noise error , is drawn from a
normal distribution with the same mean (0) and variance as L; with this simulation construction,
it can be shown by manipulation of (13) that k=Var(L)/Var(s), or what is usually called the
reliability ratio of the signal.   The k=1 case is equivalent to the " known case and k=0 is
equivalent to the " unknown case ; simulations will be conducted for k=.99, .90, .75, and .50 (the
results will demonstrate that reliability less than .50 will not be necessary).
Tables 3 shows the solution for the case where 90 percent of the poor population is
desired to work.   The percentile point utilities are those for the true wage, not the signal wage. 
When k=.99, the bottom 7.7 percent of the signal wage distribution is exempted from the work
requirement and allowed to receive a benefit of $133, while workers in the (54, 89) percentile
range receive benefit supplements to equalize their incomes with those of nonworkers (t=1 is
imposed for this group).   This solution is not very different from the " known work requirement
case, with the only difference that in that case exactly 10 percent of the low-ability distribution
was given support because there was no inaccuracy in the assignment.  Here, the government
reduces that percent in order to avoid wasting money on high-wage individuals who are
incorrectly assessed as being low-wage and and who therefore receive benefits, for their utilities
do not contribute to societal welfare.  As shown by the ‘coverage’ and ‘targeting’ rates in the  The coverage and targeting rates in the table are functionally related, for c=t(s/p),
12
where c=coverage rate, t=targeting rate, s=percent of signal wage distribution offered G for not
working, and p=percent society desires to not work (=10 percent in this case).
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table, the solution takes place at a point where all those who are offered benefits for not working
are low-wage, even though this results in only about three-fourths of low-wage individuals
covered by the program.      
12
The decile points shown in the Table reveal the noise in the signal, for there are many
individuals with true wages in the lower 50 percent of the distribution who are working because
they had a positive wage error and were “mistakenly” offered a supplemental benefit, and they
choose to accept it and to work.  The individual at the 50  percentile is of this type, for example;
th
the goverment does not start paying supplemental benefits until the 54  percentile of the signal
th
wage distribution.
As k falls and the noise increases, the government grows more cautious and reduces the
fraction of the low-s distribution to whom it offers a nonworking benefit.   For the k=.90, .75,
and .50 levels of screening accuracy, the percent offered a benefit falls to the bottom 3.9 percent,
1.3 percent, and .5 percent of the signal wage distribution, respectively.  Benefits correspondingly
increase both for the working groups and for the nonworkers who received G.   The reduction in
coverage is made to the point where there is no error in targeting.   Further reductions in k are not
simulated because, by k=.50, the government is on the verge of moving entirely to the program it
chose in Table 2 when " was completely unknown and benefits were denied to nonworkers
entirely.   
The amount of error and noise in the wage distribution increases as k falls.  For example,
the individual at the 60  true wage percentile point draws a negative error and, for k=.90 and
th  The individual at the 10  percentile of the true wage distribution has a negative wage
13 th
error and ‘mistakenly’ receives benefits.
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lower, is deemed by the government not to be eligible for supplemental benefits and hence works
without benefits (9.2 is the utility level for this individual off welfare).     Likewise, the
individuals at the 70  and 80  true wage percentile points have negative wage errors and are
th th
denied benefits if k falls sufficiently, again reducing their utility to the nonwelfare level.  The
individual at the 50  percentile, on the other hand, continues to work and receive a benefit
th
because of a sufficiently positive error draw.
Table 4 shows the results for 75 and 50 percent work cases for k=.99 and k=.50 only, and 
reveal the same pattern but with more generous benefits paid to nonworkers because a greater
fraction of the ability distribution is exempted from the work requirement.   For k=.99, benefits
are paid up to the 22  percentile of the signal wage distribution if 25 percent are desired not to
nd
work and up to the 42  percentile of the distribution if 50 percent are desired not to work.  
nd
However, as k falls, the government rapidly retreats on this generosity and moves quickly toward
the near denial of benefits to nonworkers.  In the 50-percent-work case where 50 percent of the
population is allowed not to work, only the bottom 9.5 percent of the signal wage distribution is
offered a benefit if k=.50.   The benefit is very large for that group, and no benefits are paid to
13
workers, but the 40 percent of individuals in the (10,50) percentile range whom society would
prefer not to work, do not do so but also do not receive benefits (again, there are individuals with
true wages in this range whose signal wages put them in the lower 9.5 percent of its distribution;
they receive benefits but these individuals are not at the percentile points shown in the table).  
Again the group who is offered benefits for not working is highly targeted on low-wage26
individuals as k falls, again with consequent reductions in coverage.  
The major conclusion to be drawn from these results is that the desirability of work
requirements requires a reasonably accurate screening mechanism.   While partial observability
of ability always allows a work requirement program to improve social welfare over what it
would be if there were no observability, the gains are small if the screening mechanism is not
very accurate.  In some cases, using an inaccurate screening mechanism may be worse than not
imposing work requirements at all but instead simply applying an NIT program which
manipulates only the guarantee and tax rate (e.g., V=36,067 in Table 4 for 50 percent desired to
work and k=.50 but V=37,057 in Table 2 for the NIT).
Summary
This paper has laid out a simple model of optimal work requirements when those
requirements arise from a direct preference by society for work among more able individuals.  
Work requirements are not always optimal, and their distributional effects depend heavily on the
degree to which ability is observed.  With fully observed ability, work requirements allow
benefits to be paid to workers in situations where a lump sum transfer would induce those same
individuals to quit work.   With fully unobserved ability, work requirements tend to penalize
those at the bottom of the ability distribution whom the government cannot induce to work
because of insufficient funds as well as those who are low ability and receive no benefits.  When
ability is partially observed, a reasonably accurate signal allows the government to pay benefits to
some of those at the bottom of the wage distribution while simultaneously supplementing the27
wages of workers, moving some of them over the margin into work.   But the capability of the
government to do this falls rapidly with declines in the accuracy of the signal.   Moreover, the
inaccuracy of the signal leads to a considerable amount of noise, with many high-ability
individuals inadvertently not required to work and many low-ability individuals required to work. 
 At low levels of signal accuracy, it is possible that a simple negative income tax with no
screening on ability would be socially preferable.
Several of the optimal programs reveal a four-part segmentation of the population that has
some resemblance to current US distributional policy toward single mothers.   A segment at the
bottom of the ability distribution is offered a guaranteed payment for nonwork; a segment just
above that in the ability distribution is offered nothing because of insufficient funds to induce
them to work; a segment higher up the distribution is offered an earnings supplement; and the
highest segment is offered nothing.   The US system with a cash transfer program for the very
poor with stringent eligibility and work requirements, coupled with a slightly better-off portion of
the population which is off welfare altogether, combined with a higher-ability portion which
receives significant earnings subsidies from the EITC, resembles this type of system.
These results in the paper would be altered if some of the assumptions of the model were
relaxed.  If the government had redistributional preferences (i.e., distributional weights) above
those implied by declining marginal utility of income, more support would necessarily flow to
low-ability workers, even in cases where ability is only partially observed.   If more government
funds were devoted to the transfer program, many of the constraints which result in denial of
benefits to families whom the government wishes to support would be relaxed.  
There are also many research extensions of the model used in the paper.   The strict28
assumption that no social utility is obtained from high ability individuals who do not work could
be relaxed, for example, as could the assumption that no social utility is obtained from low
ability individuals who work.   Also, the game that is assumed to be played by the government
assumes that no learning takes place after individuals demonstrate their earning ability or work
preferences.   The model in the paper does not represent the fairly complex assessment of
sanctions and compliance with sanctions that takes place when work requirements are not met
and, relatedly, the motivation of caseworkers is ignored here; caseworkers, welfare agency heads,
and society are all assumed to have the same objective function and information.   This may not
be the case and there may be agency issues among these actors.   These are all fruitful areas for
more work.
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Maximal V and Distributions of Utility at Percentile Points of the Wage Distribution
Under Optimal Schemes with Known ": Lump Sum and Work Requirement Programs
                                                                  90 Percent Desired to Work       75 Percent Desired to Work     50 Percent Desired to Work     
                                                 No                                                                                                                                                   
                                            Program          Lump Sum       Work Req.       Lump Sum        Work Req.       Lump Sum        Work Req.   
                                                                      Program           Program           Program            Program           Program            Program 
V  -- 36,847 37,062 37,543 37,543 37,776 37,776
 Wage Percentile
     10 0 180.4 117.5 75.0 75.0 38.0 38.0
     20 0 0 0 75.0 75.0 38.0 38.0
     30 0 0 0 0 0 38.0 38.0
     40 0 0 0 0 0 38.0 38.0
     50 0 0 0 0 0 38.0 38.0
     60 9.2 9.2 37.5 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2
     70 20.5 20.5 37.5 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5
     80 35.6 35.6 37.5 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6
     90 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0
G -- 192.0 122.0 76.8 76.8 38.4 38.4Table 2
Maximal V and Distributions of Utility at Percentile Points of the Wage Distribution
Under Optimal Schemes with Unknown ": NIT and Work Requirement Programs
                                                                  90 Percent Desired to Work       75 Percent Desired to Work     50 Percent Desired to Work     
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                                                                         NIT            Work Req.             NIT              Work Req.             NIT              Work Req.   
                                                                      Program           Program           Program            Program           Program            Program 
V 34,899 34,899 34,996 34,899 37,057 33,273
Wage Percentile
     10 0 0 3.5 0 17.7 0
     20 0 0 3.5 0 17.7 0
     30 0 0 3.5 0 17.7 0
     40 7.7 7.7 8.1 7.7 17.7 7.7
     50 19.2 19.2 19.2 19.2 17.7 19.2
     60 31.6 31.6 31.2 31.6 27.8 31.6
     70 45.6 45.6 44.7 45.6 39.3 45.6
     80 64.2 64.2 62.7 64.2 54.4 64.2
     90 97.9 97.9 95.4 97.9 82.1 97.9
G 0040 1 8 0
t -.26 -.26 -.22 -.26 -.02 -.26
Notes:  NIT = negative income taxTable 3
Maximal V and Distributions of Utility Under Optimal
Schemes with Partially Observed ":  90 Percent Desired to Work
                                                                              Screening Accuracy
                                                
                                                    k=.99                   k=.90                    k=.75                   k=.50
V 36,919 36,430 36,117 35,678
True Wage Percentile
     1 0 0000
     2 0 0000
     3 0 0000
     4 0 0000
     50 47.3 74.3 89.5 105.6
     60 47.3 9.2 9.2 9.2
     70 47.3 74.3 89.5 20.5
     80 47.3 74.3 35.6 35.6
     90 63.0 74.3 89.5 105.6
G 133 163 180 198
Percent of signal wage
distribution offered G 7.7 3.9 1.3 0.5
Coverage rate 77 39 13 5
1
Targeting rate 100 100 100 100
1
10 Prob(L=1 |  "< " )    0000
10 Prob(L=0 |  ">" ) .449 .441 .426 .417
Notes:
10   Coverage rate = percent of those with "< "  who are offered a benefit for not working.
1
10    Targeting rate = percent of those who are offered a benefit for not working who have "< " .   Table 4
Maximal V and Distributions of Utility Under Optimal
Schemes with Partially Observed ":  75 and 50 Percent Desired to Work
                                                    75 Percent Desired to Work         50 Percent Desired to Work
                                                                                                                                                             
                                                    k=.99                   k=.50                   k=.99                   k=.50
V 37,387 36,491 37,730 36,067
True Wage Percentile
     10 85.9 0 45.3 172.9
     20 85.9 0 45.3 0
     30 0 0 45.3 0
     40 0 0 45.3 0
     50 0 181.0 0 0
     60 9.2 9.2 9.2 9.2
     70 20.5 20.5 20.5 20.5
     80 35.6 35.6 35.6 35.6
     90 63.0 181.0 63.0 63.0
G 88 287 46 184
Percent of signal wage
distribution offered G 21.7 .8 41.8 9.5
Coverage rate 86 3 84 18
1
Targeting rate 100 100 100 96
1
p Prob(L=1 |  "< " )    0000
p Prob(L=0 |  ">" ) .348 .335 .022 .030
Notes:
p=25 or 50
p   Coverage rate = percent of those with "< "  who are offered a benefit for not working.
1
p    Targeting rate = percent of those who are offered a benefit for not working who have "< " .